

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 8, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRUCE C. CLARKE, JR.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Comments on Foreign Political and Military Reactions
to U.S. Strategies and Forces, April 4, 1969

I have some general reservations about parts of the subject paper.

1. Soviet Objectives. I am concerned about the apparent similarities between Soviet and U.S. strategic objectives (p. 3). Since we are actively debating our own objectives, and since there are significantly different views about our objectives, isn't it possible that Soviet may be a good deal more complex than the paper indicates? Also, the implied decision process in the Soviet Union is that of a centralized decision-making apparatus directing the development of the Soviet strategic posture. Perception of changes in the U.S. posture are apparently centralized at a high level and appropriate changes in force structure are directed based on largely rational considerations. The various elements of the Soviet military bureaucracy are given no identifiable roles in the force review and bureaucratic bargaining process.

Just as many significant changes in the U.S. strategic posture are the outcomes of complex bureaucratic bargaining, the Soviets probably reach many key decisions only after the conflicting views of various special interest groups have been reconciled. We need to understand this process, or at least recognize its likely importance.


The question is, are there conflicting views within the Soviet bureaucracy about what Soviet strategic objectives ought to be? Are there any reasons for believing that the Soviets might actually seek a significant advantage of their own if we decided to proceed as previously planned? How might our decisions tip the bureaucratic balance in the Soviet Union? It seems to me that some evaluation of alternative views of Soviet objectives and their implications is needed.

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2. Soviet Views on the Strategic Balance. Again, there is implied unanimity at top levels about issues such as arms talks. If important military and civilian leaders in the U.S. government and Congress can differ widely on the threat and what must be done to meet it, surely such differences exist in the Soviet Union. What are the implications about such differences for U.S. planning? Who in the Kremlin opposes talks and why? Under what circumstances might their views prevail?

3. Future Soviet Strategic Forces. For reasons cited above, I think the sentence (p. 8) "We examined each of the alternative U.S. strategies and forces and judged whether it was likely to be perceived by the USSR as a significant departure . . ." may be an oversimplified view of how the Soviets might react. Moreover, the many force structures under each strategy in the DOD study may produce very different reactions in different parts of the Soviet bureaucracy, and this may well affect the nature of "the Soviet reaction."

In general, I remain unconvinced - (a) that the Soviets, now that they have achieved rough political and military parity with the U.S., will certainly be satisfied with this strategic relationship over the long run, and (b) that an evaluation of the internal decision-making processes in the Soviet military bureaucracy would not significantly alter our view of future prospects and likely Soviet reactions.


Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.

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For: Senate Armed Services
Committee
R&D Subcommittee
Questions dated 17 Mar 69

QUESTION #4: How do we determine how much the Soviet Union spends for research and development, and how much confidence do you have in our conclusions on this point?

ANSWER : We determine Soviet spending on research and development from analysis of the Soviet budget and announcements of allocations of funds for what the Soviets call "Science." These allocations cover all "scientific" activities in the nation--what in the US would be covered by private as well as governmental sources. The Soviet concept of "Science" corresponds fairly well to the US definition of R&D, including space programs.

We cross check the trend of these estimates against all the physical evidence we have of Soviet R&D activities--new or expanded facilities, development and testing of new models and the like--to insure that the estimates are reasonable reflections of Soviet activities in this respect. Because of our uncertainties and because R&D spending is difficult to measure even in the US, we assign confidence limits of 20 percent to our estimates.

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For: Senate Armed Services
Committee
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Questions dated 17 Mar 69

QUESTION #5: How does the total amount spent by the Soviet Union compare with that spent by the United States on research and development?

ANSWER : Our estimate of Soviet R&D expenditures in 1968 is roughly about \$17 billion in terms of what the Soviet activities would cost in the US. The Soviet data may include some items not included in corresponding US calculations and may exclude some included in the US data. This factor plus existence of the confidence limits indicated in the answer to Question #4 suggests that only a broadly ranged comparison with the US should be made.

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For: Senate Armed Services
Committee

R&D Subcommittee

Questions dated 17 Mar 69

QUESTIONS #9 and #20: Have we any way of ascertaining what investment the Soviets make in facilities for R&D and for comparing that investment with our own? One measure of R&D emphasis is in the facilities which are being provided for research and development. How would you compare the expenditures in equivalent dollars for laboratory centers and research and development facilities by the Soviet Union and the United States over the past ten years?

ANSWER : The Soviets have published data on capital investment in R&D through 1965. These data indicate an investment level the equivalent of about \$500 million in 1960, rising to about \$1 billion in 1965. We estimate that the 1965 investment level was maintained through 1968. This series includes construction and reconstruction of facilities and purchases of major items of equipment, instruments, and apparatus. We have no comparable US series on industrial investment in R&D facilities available to us.

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